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MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

WISCONSIN'S NEW DISCOVERY STATUTE
INTRODUCTION

Passage of Chapter 113 of the Laws of 1961 repealed and recreated
Section 326.12 of the Wisconsin Statutes and thereby brought Wisconsin discovery procedure into harmony with the more liberal federal
practice as prescribed in Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The significance of the present trend towards the expansion of
pre-trial procedural devices in both federal and state courts is closely
related to the parallel trend toward liberalization of the rules governing
pleading. Under the older, less liberal practice, the principal burden of
formulating issues and disclosing facts rested primarily on the pleadings. Under modern federal practice, and its counterpart in an increasing
number of states, the function of the pleadings has been restricted to
giving notice of the general issues; the means for determining precise
issues and relevant information are provided by the discovery procedure. The basic philosophy of the modern procedure is that prior to
trial every party to a civil action is entitled to the disclosure of all
relevant information in the possession of any person, unless the information is in some way privileged.' The new Wisconsin statute makes two
substantial changes in the former state practice relating to discovery examinations: there is an expansion with respect to the persons who may
be examined,' and the scope of the examination itself has been ex3

panded.

II

Under the former practice, discovery examination was limited to a
party, his assignor, officer, agent or employee. The new statute provides
that the testimony "of any person including a party" may be taken for
purposes of discovery. The effect of this expansion is to create two
distinct classes of witnesses now subject to discovery: parties to the
action or their agents, and what might be termed the ordinary witness.
This latter classification may for some purposes be further subdivided
to distinguish between expert and non-expert witnesses.
The significance of the former distinction lies in the manner of examination. Subsection (9) of Section 326.12 of the new act provides
that "the examination and cross-examination of deponents shall proceed
as permitted at the trial." This in turn leads us to Section 325.14 which
provides for the adverse examination at the trial of a party or of his
or its officer, agent or employee or of persons who were in such capacity
1

See 2A

BARRON & HoLTzoFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 500-501 (1947).
2 Wis. LAws, ch. 113 (1961),
repealing and recreating, Wis.
(1959).
3 Wis. LAWS, ch. 113 (1961), repealing and recreating, W\is.
(1959).

§641, at 8-13;

STAT.

§326.12(1)

STAT.

§326.12(2)
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at the time of the occurrence of the facts subject to examination. Thus
such party-witnesses, called adversely, may be examined as if under
cross-examination, they may be freely led on all issues and are subject
to impeachment if the party presently examining does not intend to
make the witness his own thereafter. Further, they may be re-examined
only to explain or qualify testimony already given.
The method of examination of the ordinary witness is also the same
as that permitted during trial, i.e., by direct examination. Such witnesses
cannot be led unless hostile or unwilling. They, too, can probably be impeached since Subsection (10) of 326.12 provides specifically that "a
party shall not be deemed to make a person his own witness for any
purpose by taking his deposition."
III

The second substantial change effected by the new Wisconsin statute
is an expansion of the scope of the matter which may properly be made
the subject of discovery proceedings. Subsection (2) of the new 326.12
provides that, "A deponent shall be examined regarding any matter not
privileged, which is relevant to the controversy." And further, "But it
shall not be ground for objection that the testimony will be inadmissible
at the trial, if the testimony sought appears reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence." Inasmuch as these provisions
are taken verbatim from Federal Rule 26, inquiry into the history and
interpretation of this rule by the Federal Courts should cast some light
on possible development of the Wisconsin law. While the Wisconsin
Court will, of course, not be bound by such interpretations, they will
nonetheless be persuasive.
The Supreme Court Advisory Committee note to this broadening
amendment of Rule 26 states:
The purpose of discovery is to allow a broad search for facts, the
names of witnesses, or any other matters which may aid a party
in the preparation or presentation of his case. .

.

. In such a

preliminary inquiry, admissibility at trial should not be the test
as to whether the information sought is within the scope of
proper examination. Such a standard unnecessarily curtails the
utility of discovery practice. Of course, matters entirely without
bearing either as direct evidence or as aiding in the discovery of
admissible evidence are not within the scope of inquiry. To the
extent, however, that the examination develops useful information, it functions successfully as an instrument4 of discovery, even
if it produces no testimony directly admissible.
It is well to note, however, that a clear distinction must be observed between the right to take depositions, which is now largely unrestricted
by Rule 26(b), and the right to use such depositions in court which is
4

Advisory Committee Note, vol. 3A, pp. 456-57.
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very definitely restricted by Rules 26(d) and (e) ;5 and substantially
the same restrictions upon use are incorporated into the new Wisconsin
statute by subsection (7) of 326.12.
Concerning the scope of the federal procedure, the United States
Supreme Court has said:
We agree, of course, that the deposition-discovery rules are to be
accorded a broad and liberal treatment. No longer can the timehonored cry of 'fishing expedition' serve to preclude a party
from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's case.
Mutual knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both
parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party
may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his
possession. The deposition-discovery procedure simply advances
the stage at which the disclosure can be compelled from the time
of trial to the period preceding it, thus reducing the possibility
of surprise. But discovery, like all matters of procedure, has
ultimate and necessary boundaries. As indicated by Rules 30(b)
and (d), limitations inevitably must be imposed when it can be
shown that the examination is being conducted in bad faith or
in such a manner as to annoy, embarrass or oppress the person
subject to the inquiry. And as Rule 26(b) provides, further
limitations come into existence when the inquiry touches upon the
or encroaches upon the recognized domains of priviirrelevant
6
lege.

IV

The most troublesome question to arise under the broadened scope
of the federal discovery procedure is the extent to which a party may
use discovery devices to gain access to materials developed in the course
of his opponents' preparation for trial-i.e., to the writings, statements
of witnesses, reports, etc., obtained or prepared by the adverse party or
by his attorneys, agents or insurers, in anticipation of litigation or in
preparation for trial.
It has been generally held that reports made by employees to their
7
employers in the regular course of business are subject to discovery.
While there have been some differences as to the requisite showing of
cause, most courts have agreed that statements made by one party to
the adverse party are subject to discovery.8 There seems little doubt that
this is a sound result and Wisconsin, in actions for personal injuries,
where the problem is most likely to arise, has settled the matter by a
5 See Pike and Willis, The New Federal Deposition-Discovery Procedure,

38 COLUM. L. REV. 1179, 1187 (1938); Drum v. Town of Tonawanda, 13 F.R.D.
317 (D.N.Y.

1952); 2A

BARRON

& HOLTZOFF,

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND

PRO-

§646, at 59.
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
Humphries v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., 14 F.R.D. 177 (N.D. Ohio 1953);
Panella v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 14 F.R.D. 196 (N.D. Ohio 1953); Pennsylvania Railroad Co. v. Julian, 10 F.R.D. 452 (D. Del. 1950). See also
McCORMIcK, EVIDENCE §100, at 204-05 (1954); 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§2318,
2319 (3d ed. 1940).
8 2A BARRON & HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §6523 at 140-44.
CEDURE
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statute requiring production.9 There has also been substantial agreement
that the identity of witnesses with knowledge of relevant facts must be
disclosed even though such information may have been acquired solely
in preparation for trial.10
But on questions as to other materials gathered in preparation for
trial there has been little agreement among the lower federal courts.
A number of district courts have gone so far as to hold that the results
of investigations and all other matters prepared by the adversary or his
representative in contemplation of litigation were entirely immune from
discovery. Some of these decisions followed the English view and held
that such matter fell within the attorney-client privilege.' Other courts
in denying discovery emphasized the essential unfairness of letting one
party obtain free of charge material gathered by his adversary, stating
that to permit such a course "would penalize the diligent and place a
2
premium on laziness.'
At the same time other courts were going to the opposite extreme
and holding that similar materials obtained in preparation for trial or in
anticipation of litigation were freely discoverable with little, if any,
limitation.. 3 The attitude of these courts was well summed up by Judge
Frank in Hoffman v. Palmer,14 in which he commented that:
Some lawyers also grumble, saying that it is 'unfair' that a lawyer
who has diligently prepared his case should be obliged to let
counsel for the adversary scrutinize his data. But the reformers
are surely right in replying that 'unfairness' to a diligent lawyer
is of no importance as against much-needed improvement in ju9 Wis. STAT. §325.28

(1959).

10 Maryland for use of Montvila v. Pan-American Bus Lines, Inc., 1 F.R.D. 213

(D. Md. 1940) (insurance adjuster may be examined as to identity and location of persons having knowledge of relevant facts, since these facts are

within his knowledge); Stern v. Exposition Greyhound, Inc., 1 F.R.D. 696

(E.D.N.Y. 1941) ; In the Matter of Examination of Citizens Casualty Co. of
New York, 3 F.R.D. 171 (S.D.N.Y. 1942) (plaintiff may obtain names of eye
witnesses to accident in examination before trial; fact that the names of
witnesses may be contained in a report prepared by an employee of and attorney for insurance company does not make the information privileged);
Ryan v. Lehigh Valley R. Co., 5 F.R.D. 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1946) (names of wit-

nesses are not privileged, although their statements might be). Contra:
Poppino v. Jones Store Co., 1 F.R.D. 215 (W.D. Mo. 1940) (not admissible

evidence) ; Cortese v. British Ministry of War Transport Representative, 8
F.R. Serv. 30a22, Case 4 (S.D.N.Y. 1945) (party may not inquire as to
names of witnesses acquired by independent effort of insurer in natural course
of its duties in preparing defense of action).
"McCarthy v. Palmer, 29 F. Supp. 585 (E.D.N.Y. 1939). See, also, Connewary

v. City of New York, 32 F. Supp. 54 (E.D.N.Y. 1940); Maryland for Use of

Montirla v. Pan American Bus Lines, 1 F.R.D. 213 (D. Md. 1940) ; Piorkow-

ski v. Socony Vacuum Oil Co., 1 F.R.D. 407 (M.D. Pa. 1940); Courteau v.
Interlake S.S. Co., 1 F.R.D. 525 (W.D. Mich. 1941); Hercules Powder Co.

v. Rohm & Haas Co., 3 F.R.D. 328 (D. Del. 1944).
"2McCarthy v. Palmer, 29 F. Supp. 585 (E.D.N.Y. 1939).
13 Dugger v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 5 F.R.D. 334 (E.D.N.Y. 1946); Price
v. Levitt, 29 F. Supp. 164 (E.D.N.Y. 1939) ; Blank v. Great Northern Ry. Co.,
4 F.R.D. 213 (D. Minn. 1943).
14

129 F. 2d 976 (2d Cir. 1942).
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dicial ascertainment of the 'facts' of cases; the public interest in
such ascertainment is paramount .... 15
V
It was with this varied background of lower court decisions that the
United States Supreme Court in 1947 considered the matter for the first
and only time in the leading case of Hickman v. Taylor.16 In that case
five of the nine crewmen, including Norman Hickman, were drowned in
the sinking of a tugboat. Three days after the drowning Fortenbaugh,
an attorney, was retained by the tug-owners and the underwriters to
defend them in whatever litigation might arise. Fortenbaugh took written signed statements from the four surviving crewmen, who had been
previously examined before a public hearing conducted by the United
States Steamboat Inspectors. He also interviewed other persons believed
to have some information relating to the accident and in some cases he
made memoranda of what they told him. Seven months after the sinking
Hickman's administrator brought suit against the tug-owners under the
Jones Act and one year thereafter the administrator sought discovery
of both the written signed statements and the lawyer's memoranda and
mental impressions of the oral statements. The District Court ordered
production of all these materials, though it did provide that the memoranda could first be submitted to the Court for a determination of those
17
portions which should be revealed to the plaintiff.
Fortenbaugh and the tug-owners refused to comply and appealed
their convictions for criminal contempt of court to the Court of Appeals
for the Third Circuit. The Third Circuit reversed, holding that discovery
could not be had because the matter was privileged.' While conceding
that the material being sought was not within the attorney-client privilege as it is applicable to testimony sought to be introduced in the courtroom, the Court held that the term "privilege" as it is used in the Federal
Rules is not identical with the term as used in the rules of evidence;
and that the scope of the attorney-client privilege at the discovery stage
must be expanded to include what it termed the "work product of the
lawyer."
The United States Supreme Court after once denying certiorari
granted review on the basis of the importance of the problem and the
great divergence of views in the lower courts. 19 It unanimously affirmed
the Third Circuit's holding that the discovery herein sought was improper, but did so on a different basis than that of the Circuit Court.
While summarily rejecting the concept of the attorney-client privilege
15 Id. at 997.
:16329 U.S. 495 (1947).
17Hickman v. Taylor, 4 F.R.D. 479 (E.D. Pa. 1945).
18 Hickman v. Taylor, 153 F. 2d 212 (3d Cir. 1945).
19 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
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as a rationale for denying discovery, the Court held that there is a broad
public policy protecting an attorney's "work product" against unwarranted invasions of privacy:
Historically, a lawyer is an officer of the court and is bound to
work for the advancement of justice while faithfully protecting
the rightful interests of his client. In performing his various duties, however, it is essential that a lawyer work with a certain
degree of privacy, free from unnecessary intrusion by opposing
parties and their counsel. Proper preparation of a client's case
demands that he assemble information, sift what he considers to
be the relevant from the irrelevant facts, prepare his legal theories
and plan his strategy without undue and needless interference.
That is the historical and the necessary way in which lawyers
act within the framework of our system of jurisprudence to promote justice and to protect their clients' interests. This work is reflected, of course, in interviews, statements, memoranda, correspondence, briefs, mental impressions, personal beliefs, and
countless other intangible ways-aptly though roughly termed by
the Circuit Court of Appeals in this case as the 'work product of
the lawyer.' Were such materials open to opposing counsel on
mere demand, much of what is now put down in writing would
remain unwritten. An attorney's thoughts, herefore inviolate,
would not be his own. Inefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices
would inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice and in the
preparation of cases for trial. The effect on the legal profession
would be demoralizing. And the interests
of the clients and the
20
cause of justice would be poorly served.
But the Court went on to say that this did not mean that all written
materials obtained or prepared by an attorney with an eye toward litigation are necessarily immune from discovery in all cases:
Where relevant and non-privileged facts remain hidden in an
attorney's file and where production of those facts is essential to
the preparation of one's case, discovery may properly be had.
Such written statements and documents might, under certain circumstances, be admissible in evidence or give clues as to the
existence or location of relevant facts. Or they might be useful
for purposes of impeachment or corroboration. And production
might be justified where the witnesses
are no longer available or
21
can be reached only with difficulty.
Further, it was pointed out that the burden rests on the party seeking
discovery of the lawyer's "work product" to establish adequate reasons
to justify production through a subpoena or court order.
The language used by Justice Murphy throughout his opinion gives
rise to the inference that the cause for discovery of memoranda and
mental impressions of oral statements must be greater than that required for the production of written statements. There is repeated em2
0 Id. at 510-11.
21 Id. at 511.
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phasis on the additional dangers inherent in compelling an attorney to
subject his mental processes to the scrutiny of his adversary, and the
Court states that,
If there should be a rare situation justifying production of these
matters, petitioner's case is not of that type.22
Nor has this writer been able to find any subsequent case which has
held that such a rare situation did, in fact, exist. The concurring opinion
of Justice Jackson makes a pointed analysis of the demoralizing effects
likely to result from the practice of making a lawyer's impressions a
proper subject of discovery.
It can be said that Hickman v. Taylor adopted a middle position by
giving the lawyer's work product a qualified immunity from discovery.
Such material is discoverable, but only on a substantial showing of
"necessity or justification," with the further distinction that, for practical purposes, the mental impressions or opinions of the lawyer are
absolutely immune from discovery.
VI
One of the major problems left unresolved by the Supreme Court in
Hickman v. Taylor is that of establishing limits to determine what is
properly includible within the category of attorney's work product. One
question of practical importance is whether the work product immunity
is applicable only to statements and other material obtained by the trial
counsel himself, or whether the qualified protection extends also to
statements obtained by claims agents or investigators, which may ultimately be used by counsel. Here there is conflict among the lower federal courts.
The Third Circuit in Alltmont v. United States21 held that even
though the Hickman case was, on its facts, limited to statements obtained directly by the defendant's lawyer,
.. . its rationale has a much broader sweep and applied to all
statements of prospective witnesses which a party has obtained
for his trial counsel's use. For since, as the Court held, statements
of prospective witnesses obtained by a lawyer are not protected
by the historic privilege inherent in the lawyer-client relationship
and are only protected against disclosure if the adverse party
cannot show good cause for their production, we can see no
logical basis for making any distinction between statements of
witnesses secured by a party's trial counsel personally in preparation for trial and those obtained by others for the use of the
party's trial counsel. In each case the statements are obtained in
preparation for litigation and ultimately find their way into trial
counsel's files for his use in representing his client at the trial.
...Certainly no valid distinction can be based on the fact that
22d. at 513.
23 177 F. 2d 971 (3d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 967 (1950).
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in the one case trial counsel does all the work of preparation for
trial, including the interviewing of witnesses, while in the other
case he is assisted by others employed by him or by his client.
Indeed to make such a distinction would discriminate in favor
of the party whose lawyer himself does all the work of preparation for trial and against
the one whose counsel delegates part
24
of that task to others.

The logic of the Alltmont case is compelling. A similar view was taken
by the District Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin in Hanke
v. Milwaukee Electric Railway & Transport Co. 25 In that case the discovery sought related to written and oral statements obtained from witnesses by the defendant's claims department. The Court followed the
prescription of the Hickman case and held that in order to succeed, the
plaintiff, as the party seeking production of such statements, must first
meet his burden of showing the necessity thereof, or clearly establish
that the denial of such production would unduly prejudice the preparation of his case causing hardship or injustice.
Though a number of other cases have subscribed to the doctrine of
the Alltmont and Hanke cases, 28 the majority view seems to be that the
work product immunity does not extend to statements obtained by a
claims agent or investigator.27This result is apparently reached by interpreting the Hickman decision as stating a policy that is designed to
preserve the unique role of the attorney in the adversary system.
VII
Once it has been determined that a particular matter is properly
categorized as work product of the attorney, it is nevertheless still subject to discovery only upon a sufficient showing of necessity or justification. As might be expected under such a highly subjective test, the decisions on what constitutes such sufficiency span a broad range.
The most liberal view is that the mere existence of a lapse of time
between the taking of the statement sought to be discovered and the
time at which the same witness became available for interview by the
opposing party is sufficient to require production. These courts reason
that statements taken from witnesses close to the time of the occurrence
are unique in that they provide an immediate impression of the facts
28
and are most likely accurately to reflect the impression of the witness.
177 F. 2d at 976.
F.R.D. 540 (D. Wis. 1947).

241d.
257
2

6Raudenbusch v. Reading Co., 9 F.R.D. 670 (E.D. Pa. 1950); Snyder v. U.S.,

20 F.R.D. 7 (E.D.N.Y. 1956) ; Floe v. Plowden, 10 F.R.D. 514 (E.D.S.C. 1950) ;
Adams v. U.S., 260 F. 2d 467 (5th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. '934
(1959).

27 Supra note 8, §652.2, at 131.

28 See Henderson v. Southern R. Co., 17 F.R.D. 349 (E.D. Tenn. 1955) ; Pennsylvania R. Co. v. Julian, 10 F;R.D. 452 (D. Del. 1950); Cairns v. Chicago Exp.
Inc., 25 F.R.D. 169 (N.D. Ohio 1960).
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It was on this basis that the court in DeBruce v. PennsylvaniaR. Co.29
held that the party seeking discovery of statements obtained by a claims
department need show no more than that the accident had occurred a
year before, that the defendant's claims department had immediately
interviewed the witnesses and taken their statements and that the plaintiff was not in a position to do so until the bringing of the suit. The
court considered the statement of a witness taken immediately after the
accident to be a "catalyst of unique value in the development of the
truth through the judicial process," which should be available to both
parties, no matter which one obtained it.
The more generally accepted view, however, is that necessity of
justification for production cannot be shown where the identity of witnesses is known and where the party can obtain the information sought
by taking their depositions."0 The cases are divided on whether increased
expense to the moving party is a sufficient justification to require production of statements taken from witnesses who are otherwise available.31 Where the witness is for one reason or another no longer available, so that the moving party cannot obtain his version of the facts,
production will ordinarily be required. But the mere fact that the witnesses are in another state has been held insufficient to constitute such
unavailability.

32

VIII

A problem closely related to that of the immunity to be given materials gathered by claims agents and investigators is that of determining what limitations, if any, are imposed on the right to take the depositions of experts, to obtain production of their reports and to inquire
into the foundation of such reports.
It is interesting to note that among the proposed amendments to the
Federal Rules recommended by the Advisory Committee in 1946 was
a restriction upon the discovery of writings obtained or prepared by
the adverse party, his attorney, surety, indemnitor or agent in anticipation of litigation or in preparation for trial except upon a showing that
denial of such a discover would be unfairly prejudicial causing undue
hardship or injustice to the moving party. And further that there be an
F.R.D. 403 (E.D. Pa. 1947).
Cogdill v. T.V.A., 7 F.R.D. 411 (E.D. Tenn. 1947); Diniero v. United States
Lines Co., 21 F.R.D. 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1957); McDonald v. Pennsylvania R.
Co., 15 F.R.D. 145 (E.D. Pa. 1951); McSparran v. Bethlehem-Cuba Iron

296
30

Mines Co., 26 F.R.D. 619 (E.D. Pa. 1960).

31 For cases holding expense to constitute justification, see: Durkin v. Pet Milk

Co., 14 F.R.D. 385 (W.D. Ark. 1953); Naylor v. Isthmian S. S. Co., 10 F.R.D.
128 (S.D.N.Y. 1950) ; Jones v. Westinghouse Electric Supply Co., 128 A. 2d
808 (1957). Contra: Berger v. Central Vermont R. Co., 8 F.R.D. 419 (D. Mass.
1948) ; Lester v. Isbrandtsen Co., 10 F.R.D. 338 (S.D. Tex. 1950) ; Gebhard
v. Isbrandtsen Co., 10 F.R.D. 119 (S.D.N.Y. 1950).
3 Lester v. Isbrandtsen Co., 10 F.R.D. 338 (S.D. Tex. 1950) ; Reeves v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 8 F.R.D. 616 (D. Del. 1949) ; Berger v. Central Vermont R. Co.,
8 F.R.D. 419 (D. Mass. 1948).
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absolute prohibition on the production or inspection of any writings
reflecting an attorney's mental impressions, conclusions, opinions or legal theories, or, except as provided in Rule 35,33 the conclusions of an
expert.3 4 Though the Supreme Court gave no explanation of its failure
to adopt this amendment, it has been generally assumed that it preferred
to deal with the problem by case decisions rather than by rule making35
Hickman v. Taylor being sub judice at that time.
The extent to which the expert witness and the materials which he
may prepare are subject to discovery again presents an area of broad
divergence and conflicts of authority. Some cases have taken the strict
view that it is unfair to allow one party to obtain free the opinion of an
expert who has been paid by his adversary. A typical statement of this
position is found in Lewis v. United Air Lines Transport Corp:
To permit a party to take the deposition of an expert of the opposite party to whom the latter has obligated himself to pay a
considerable sum of money, would be equivalent to taking another's property without compensation therefor.3 r
Other courts have refused to allow unlimited discovery of the reports of experts on the theory that such reports are prepared to assist
counsel and hence are entitled to the same protection as the attorney's
work product. These courts apply the limitations of Hickman v. Taylor
and require that a showing of necessity or justification be made before
discovery involving experts is allowed. In Carpenter-TrantDrilling Co.
v. Magnolia Petroleum Corp.3 7 a blanket request for reports which an
expert had submitted to counsel on technical facts to be used in the
preparation for trial was held to be a request for the attorney's work
product. Discovery was denied on the ground that an attorney for one
party is not entitled to the fruits of his opponent's labor in this regard
without a strong showing of good cause:
This Court, however, feels that when experts in an extremely
technical field have been retained to advise counsel in the case
as to proper technical interpretation of certain facts, and the state
of technical information, that this partakes of the counsel's work
product. The same protection accorded to lawyers' other work as
necessary to 'prepare his legal theories and plan his strategy without undue and needless interference' must be accorded38 to his
technical information and strategy in the use of experts.
33

Providing discovery of medical examinations in cases involving personal in-

juries.
Report of Proposed Amendments, June, 1946, pp. 39-40.
3 Supra note 8, §652 at 122-23.
34

36 32 F. Supp. 21 (W.D. Pa. 1940). See, also: Walsh v. Reynold Metals Co.,

15 F.R.D. 376 (D. N.J. 1954); Boynton v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 36 F.
Supp. 593 (D. Mass. 1941); Roberson v. Graham Corp., 14 F.R.D. 83 (D.

Mass. 1953).

37 23 F.R.D. 257 (D. Neb. 1959).
38 Id. at 261.
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The Hickman v. Taylor test was also applied in Colden v. R. J.
Schofield Motors,39 but there the court found the requisite showing to
have been made and discovery was allowed. In that case the automobile
in question had been disassembled for inspection by the plaintiff's expert, so that the defendant could no longer have its own examination
made and production of a copy of the report of plaintiff's expert was
ordered.
Similarly, in a complicated infringement suit, where it was impossible for the plaintiff to establish infringement or for the defendant to
attack the validity of the patent except by opinion testimony of experts,
such opinions were held to be, from a practical point of view, the facts
40
of the case, and discovery was permitted.
The diversity of judicial opinion on the matter of discovery re the
expert is pointedly illustrated by the history of one litigation in which
examination of two expert witnesses regarding the same information
was sought in two District Courts. A Massachusetts District Court held
that an expert employed by the attorneys to make metallographic x-rays
was immune from discovery about his conclusions or anything else relating to his work, as such information was privileged as a matter of
public policy. 41 On the other hand, an Ohio District Court,42 in a decision upheld by the Sixth Circuit, 43 permitted the discovery examination of another expert in x-ray metallography who had been similarly
employed. In the opinion of the Sixth Circuit, the obvious purpose of
the Rules of Civil Procedure is to broaden the scope of inquiry of adverse witnesses and thus gainsays the thought that the privilege protecting the work product of the lawyer should be liberally extended to
cover information sought of one who is not a lawyer, but who has
merely been retained by an attorney as an expert in a scientific field.
Courts taking this latter view commonly permit such discovery without any offer to pay part of the fees likely to have been paid the expert
by the adverse party. They arrive at this result by analogy to the rule
that an expert may be compelled to testify at the trial on matters of
expert opinion upon tender of the ordinary witness fee. The general
American position is that, in the absence of statute, an expert stands on
the same footing as any other witness and may be compelled to testify
without the payment of special compensation, even though his knowledge of the facts may have been acquired through scientific study and
professional practice. The expert cannot, however, be required to con39 14 F.R.D. 521 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
40E. I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 24 F.R.D. 416

(D. Del. 1959).

41 Cold 'Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7 F.R.D. 684 (D. Mass.
42
43

1947).
Cold M etal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7 F.R.D. 425 (N.D.
Ohio 1947).
Sachs v. Aluminum Co. of America, 167 F. 2d 570 (6th Cir. 1948).
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duct experiments, make special examinations, or do anything other than
testify. Some of such courts also reason that since the expert is subject
to cross-examination on his conclusions during trial, discovery before
trial is proper on the theory that such procedure "simply advances the
stages at which disclosure can be compelled from the time of trial to the
period preceding it."Ix
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in its first interpretation of the liberalized Wisconsin discovery procedure under the new Wis. Stat.
326.12 has, in State ex rel. Reynolds v. Circuit Court for Waukesha
County45 squarely aligned itself with those courts taking the most liberal view of the scope of the pre-trial discovery system so far as discovery of experts is concerned. 46 That case was a proceeding in which the
State sought a writ of prohibition requiring the Circuit Court of Waukesha County to vacate an order requiring expert appraisers employed as
consultants to the State Highway Commission to give certain depositions before a Court Commissioner. The plaintiffs seeking such discovery owned land which had been taken by the State Highway Commission as condemnor and for which an award was made. Plaintiffs appealed to the Circuit Court and a first trial before Judge Voss ended in
a mistrial. Pursuant to an order of the court, apparently entered as part
of pretrial procedure, it was disclosed that the damages estimated by
the State's appraisers averaged just under $46,000, while those estimated by plaintiff's appraisers averaged over $111,000. Prior to the
second trial, scheduled before Judge Gramling, plaintiff-owners subpoenaed the Highway Commission's expert appraisers to a discovery
examination and counsel attempted to question them concerning their
appraisal of plaintiff's property. The experts refused to answer whereupon the matter was certified to the Circuit Court. Judge Gramling ordered that the experts be compelled to state (a) the facts they observed
in appraising the property; (b) the information they obtained; (c)
their opinion as to value; and (d) the method used in arriving at their
valuation. The Supreme Court took jurisdiction over the alternative writ
of prohibition obtained by the State and after reviewing the merits of
the case issued a writ of consultation authorizing the examination of
the experts to proceed as ordered by Judge Gramling.
In his analysis of the case, Justice Fairchild, writing for the Court,
held that the general discovery statute 326.12 was applicable to condemnation cases, in spite of the specialized procedures of Chapter 32
dealing particularly with condemnation proceedings. He pointed out that
44

Bergstrom Paper Co. v. Continental Insurance Co., 7 F.R.D. 548, 550 (E.D.
Wis. 1947).
1515 Wis. 2d 311, 112 N.W. 2d 686 (1961).
46 See Sachs v. Aluminum Co. of America, supra note 43.
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at the time Chapter 32 was enacted it provided more liberal discovery
than did the General Statutes, but that the recent enactment of 326.12
enlarged the rights of all litigants to discovery as a general policy of
the state. Hence it was held that there was no inconsistency of policy
in applying 326.12 to appeals under Chapter 32.
Turning next to the State's claim of the attorney-client privilege, the
Court called attention to the narrow wording of the relevant Wisconsin
Statute4 7 which prohibits disclosure of communications made by clients
to their attorneys. A distinction was drawn between compelling a witness to disclose knowledge or information of relevant facts and compelling him to disclose a communication of such knowledge or information, or the fact of such communication, to his attorney:
As a general principle we conclude that a claim of privilege may
properly be interposed if one of these experts is asked to disclose
a communication which he has made as a consultant employed
by the highway commission to the commission or its staff or
counsel in connection with the condemnation of plaintiff's property, but the attorney-client privilege does not preclude these experts from disclosing the relevant opinions they have formed,
whether reported or not, and the observations, knowledge, information and theories on which the opinions are based.48
While recognizing that some federal courts have held that the qualified immunity granted to a lawyer's work product is applicable to the
work and conclusions of experts, Justice Fairchild squarely rejected
this view. Citing the opinion of the Sixth Circuit in the Sachs case,49
he reiterated that, "The primary concern of our courts of justice is to
elicit truth essential to correct adjudication." 50
The question then remains what about statements of witnesses
garnered by an attorney and similar statements not garnered by the
attorney himself. So far as statements garnered by an attorney are
concerned, our court has already held that they are not within the attorney-client privilege. In Tomek v. Farmers Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 51 it was held that Sec. 325.22 Stats., in providing that an
attorney at law shall not be allowed to disclose a communication "made
by his client to him," does not preclude an attorney from testifying as
to transactions had with or communications made to him by third persons even though these matters came to his knowledge in consequence
of his retainer as an attorney. 52 However, the Wisconsin Court has never
STAT. §325.22 (1959), which provides in part: "An attorney or counselor
at law shall not be allowed to disclose a communication made by his client
to him, or his advice given thereon in the course of his professional employment."
48 Supra note 45, at 690.
9Supra note 43.
50 Supra note 45, at 691.
51268 Wis. 566, 68 N.W. 2d 573 (1955).
52 Id. at 569.
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passed upon the question of whether the non-privileged nature of this
information conclusively allows discovery without limitation, or whether
good cause must first be shown. There is nothing in the Reynolds decision to indicate that our Court will not classify such material as "work
product" and thus subject to the requirement of a showing of necessity
53
or justification as imposed by Hickman v. Taylor.
A concluding paragraph of the Reynolds decision states:
In enacting sec. 326.12, Stats., in its present form, the legislature
has decided to liberalize our discovery procedure. Such decision
must be based upon the belief that trials will be more likely to
accomplish justice between the parties, and may at times be
avoided or shortened in the public interest as well, if material
relevant testimony is made available to all parties before trial.54
An application of this reasoning to the question of discovery of statements of witnesses garnered by persons other than the attorney himself
would seem to indicate that the Wisconsin Court will there also adopt
the view of the liberal federal courts.
CONCLUSION

The Wisconsin Court in its interpretation of the liberalized discovery procedure has placed primary emphasis on the need for improvement in the judicial ascertainment of facts. While some commentators
have interpreted decisions in this vein as tending to impair the adversary nature of the common law system, the effect on our state practice remains to be seen. It may be worthy of note that many states 55
which, like Wisconsin, have adopted the federal discovery rules have
further seen fit by special rules to impose some modifications limiting
discovery examinations of claims agents, investigators and experts.
The alternative solution in Wisconsin may perhaps be found in dealing
with the problem by rule, or by amendment of the Statute after study
by the Judicial Council.
GiLDA B. SHELLOW

53

Supra note 6.
54
Supra note 45, at 324, 112 N.W. 2d at 692.
55
Including: IDAHO R.C.P. §26(b); Ky. R.C.P. §37.02; LA. C.C.P. AiT. §1452;
ME. R.C.P. §26(b); MixN. R.C.P. §26.02; N-v. R.C.P. §30(b); N.J. R.R.
§4:16-2; PA. R.C.P. §4011(d); TEx. R.C.P. §167; UTAH R.C.P. §30(b);
WASH. R. PLEADING, PRACTicE & PRocmuRz §26(b); W. VA. R.C.P. §34(b).

